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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
•v- : 
Case No. 860532 
LELAND THOMAS DEMILLE, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
CTATEMENT_OF_ISSUES_PRKM 
1 . Did the State prove the elements of Second Degree 
murder? 
2 . Is a juror a f f i d a v i t that descr ibes the mental 
processes of the jurors during the de l ibera t ions admiss ible for 
purposes of verdic t impeachment? 
§TATI!ffiNT_QF_TeE_£ASE 
This i s an appeal from a jury verdict and convic t ion of 
appel lant Leland Thomas DeMille, of murder i n the second degree 
i n v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(c) (depraved 
ind i f f erence homicide) , a f i r s t degree f e lony . 
fiQURSE^QF^THE^fBOCEEpiNSS^Baaf 
This case was t r i e d t o a jury in Fi f th Judic ia l 
D i s t r i c t Court, Judge J. Harlan Burns, pres iding on July 28 
through July 3 1 , 1986. Following the t r i a l , the jury found 
Defendant g u i l t y of second degree murder. 
On August 26 , 1986, Defendant submitted a motion for a 
new t r i a l , which motion was denied on September 26 , 1986. 
Judge Burns sentenced Defendant on September 1 7 , 1986, 
to serve 5 years t o l i f e , recommending that Defendant be 
incarcerated for ten years because the offense was "extremely 
heinous" par t i cu lar ly in l i g h t of the v i c t i m 1 s par t i cu lar 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y (Tr. of September 17 , 1986, p. 10) • 
Defendant f i l e d a not ice of appeal t o t h i s Court on 
October 17 , 1986. 
SDMMARY_OF_ARGDMEOT§ 
Defendant was properly convicted of second degree 
murder under Utah Code Ann. 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 3 ( c ) . The State proved that 
Ronnie1s i n j u r i e s were not i n f l i c t e d a c c i d e n t a l l y , that the 
i n j u r i e s were incurred when Ronnie was in Defendant's s o l e 
custody and contro l , and that the s ever i ty of the i n j u r i e s 
forec losed any claim that Defendant, in i n f l i c t i n g the grave risk 
of death that h i s ac t ions wrought on Ronnie's l i f e , f a i l e d t o act 
with the r e q u i s i t e i n t e n t . 
The S t a t e ' s case was further bo l s tered by the 
inadequacies and i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s of Defendant's explanat ions for 
Ronnie's condi t ion , which inadequacies provided further 
c ircumstant ia l evidence of Defendant's g u i l t . 
Because the juror a f f i d a v i t submitted by Defendant did 
not address outs ide in f luences on the jury, or extraneous 
pre jud ic ia l information that was i n t e r j e c t e d i n t o the realm of 
the jurors, but addressed the mental processes and deliberations 
of the jurors, it was incompetent evidence for impeachment of the 
verdict. 
Had Defendant participated in the voir dire, instead of 
waiving his opportunity to object to the participation of the 
jurors, he could not have succeeded in raising a challenge for 
cause based on the circumstances described in the affidavit. 
PACTS 
On May 5, 1985 at approximately 3:15 p.m. Ronald Wayne 
Davies ("Ronnie") a three year old male child, was brought into 
the emergency room of the Dixie Medical Center in St. George by 
his mother, Jan Davies, (now Jan DeMille), and Defendant Leland 
Thomas DeMille (Tr. 104) . Ronnie was unconscious. He was having 
difficulty breathing. His right pupil was fixed and dilated, and 
he had multiple bruises on his body (Tr. 105) . Medical personnel 
recognized that Ronnie had suffered a head injury and was in 
critical condition (Tr. 146, 186). Ronnie was diagnosed as 
having a skull fracture that nearly encompassed his entire skull. 
The fracture tore the dura mater (outer covering of the brain) 
(Tr. 328, 329). Ronnie was suffering from extreme brain edema 
(swelling) which caused his brain to expand against his skull 
until it began to deteriorate under the pressure (Tr. 332), an 
acute subdural hematoma (severe blood clot on the brain) (Tr. 
336)., a hemorrhage in his sternocleidomastoid muscle (injury to 
the neck) (Tr. 322) , and mul t ip le bruises (Tr. 105) . Dr. 
VanNorman, the emergency room physician who attended Ronnie, 
concluded t h a t the ch i ld 1 s condition was the r e s u l t of a severe 
blow t o the head which occurred minutes to hours before Ronnie 
was brought to Dixie Medical Center (Tr. 199) . 
Medical technicians performed a r t i f i c i a l r e s p i r a t i o n , 
put him on a hear t monitor and an I .V . , and x-rayed h i s head with 
a CT scan (Tr. 105-106). I t was planned for Ronnie to be 
t ranspor ted t o Las Vegas for expert t reatment, but immediately 
af ter the CT scan was completed, Ronnie's l e f t eye became fixed 
and d i l a t ed , indicat ing t h a t Ronnie1s condition was de te r io ra t ing 
rap id ly , and the doctors in St . George were forced to d r i l l a 
burr hole in Ronnie's skul l to evacuate par t of the subdural 
hemotoma and re l i eve the mounting pressure from h i s swelling 
brain (Tr. 126, 150) . The small hole was placed, the dura was 
inc i sed , and blood and brain t i s s u e rushed from the hole , 
evidencing the severe i n t r a c r a n i a l pressure caused by the injury 
to Ronnie's brain (Tr. 150). 
After being taken to the Humana Sunrise Memorial 
Hospital in Las Vegas by he l i cop te r , Ronnie underwent surgery 
cons is t ing of the d r i l l i n g of another burr hole, and a craniotomy 
(removal of a bone flap) to further r e l i eve the pressure on h i s 
brain (Tr. 252) . Although Ronnie was the rea f te r kept in the 
in tens ive care unit on a v e n t i l a t o r and a hear t monitor, and 
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under medication, the efforts of his caretakers could not reverse 
the damage done to his brain, and he died on May 9, 1985. 
In attempting to treat Ronnie, doctors in St. George 
and in Las Vegas e l i c i t e d explanations from the DeMilles about 
Ronnie's a c t i v i t i e s before he presented at the Emergency Room. 
The explanations referred to events that had happened during the 
week before Ronnie presented with i s injuries . None of the 
events described occurred on May 5th, the day that Ronnie was in 
Defendant's sole custody, and the day that Ronnie was brought 
into the Emergency Room. All of the medical practitioners who 
were familiar with Ronnie's injuries found those explanations to 
be inadequate in l ight of Ronnie's injuries (Tr. 113, 204, 206, 
263, 535). Medical technicians in St. George contacted o f f i c i a l s 
at social services (Tr. 114, 130), and the Las Vegas physicians 
also suspected child abuse, and contacted police (Tr. 416). 
Because the explanations given to the doctors by the 
DeMilles did not coincide with the necessary time frame of the 
trauma and did not account for the massive trauma that was 
required to cause injuries as extensive as Ronnie's, his body was 
sent to the coroner for an autopsy (Tr. 269). Dr. James Y. 
Clarke, of the Clark County Coroner's Office, performed the 
autopsy and determined from the condition of Ronnie's body that 
h i s death was caused by a homicidal blow to the head (Tr. 336)• 
He further opined that the injury was in f l i c ted four to five days 
- 5 -
pr ior to the autopsy on May 10, 1985, consis tent with Dr. 
VanNorman's opinion tha t Ronnie was injured on May 5 , 1985 (Tr. 
4 0 6 ) . 
From January of 1985 through June of 1985r Defendant 
was l iv ing with Jan Davies (Tr, 684). They were married in June 
of 1985 (Tr. 621) . Defendant was baby s i t t i n g Ronnie on Sunday, 
May 5 , 1985, while Jan Davies worked a 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. 
sh i f t as a dispatcher for the St . George Police Department (Tr. 
754-812). Defendant t e s t i f e d tha t Ronnie seemed j u s t f ine during 
the day on Sunday. The chi ld help him with yard work (Tr. 786) 
and played (Tr. 765). Defendant a lso es tab l i shed tha t Ronnie 
spoke to h i s mother by telephone a t about 2:30 p.m. on Sunday 
(Tr. 786). Defendant al leged tha t a t about 2:50 p.m. Ronnie went 
into the bathroom, tha t shor t ly thereaf ter he stood up from the 
t o i l e t , l e t out a cry, and passed out (Tr. 794). 
Dr. Marion L. Walker, a ped i a t r i c neurosurgeon from 
Primary Chi ldren 's Hospital in Sal t Lake City, Utah, reviewed a l l 
of the medical r epor t s , autopsy r epor t s , autopsy photographs, and 
t r a n s c r i p t s of interviews for the purpose of rendering an expert 
opinion as to the cause of Ronnie's death (Tr. 527) . Based upon 
tha t review, Dr. Walker concluded tha t within one hour of the 
time Ronnie presented for treatment a t Dixie Medical Center (Tr. 
591), Ronnie's head was e i ther struck by a blunt object or was 
struck against a blunt surface (Tr. 538, 540) with great 
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v e l o c i t y , equivalent t o the v e l o c i t y developed in an 
uninterrupted f a l l from a second or th ird story bui lding onto a 
concrete surface (Tr. 5 3 1 ) . 
Dr. Walker a l so expressed the opinion that due to the 
nature of the i n j u r i e s , Ronnie would neces sar i ly have been 
unconscious from the moment the injury was i n f l i c t e d and that he 
r e a l l y had no chance of survival from that point on (Tr. 548) . 
He was ab le to exclude a l l accidental causes of the injury , such 
as a f a l l in the bathroom or off a table (Tr. 532) . Dr. Walker's 
opinion was that the defendant, who admittedly had e x c l u s i v e 
control of Ronnie between 2:30 p.m. (the time of the phone c a l l 
t o Jan Davies) and 3:10 p.m. (when Ronnie was admitted t o Dixie 
Medical Center), probably picked Ronnie up in some way and 
smashed h i s head against a blunt , hard surface with the v e l o c i t y 
noted above (Tr. 539, 553) . 
Defendant was charged with second degree murder, and a 
unanimous jury convicted him (Tr. 852) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I . 
THE STATE PR WED THE ELEMENTS OP SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER. 
Defendants f i r s t contention on appeal i s that the 
S ta te f a i l e d to provide s u f f i c i e n t evidence of Defendant's in ten t 
t o k i l l Ronnie. Defendant couches t h i s argument in an extended 
comparison of second degree murder, manslaughter, and negl igent 
• 7 -
homicide, implying that he should have been convicted of a lesser 
included offense, if at all* Defendant made a tactical decision 
not to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses (Tr. 833) 
fitate^y^Wggd, 648, P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982) stands for the 
proposition that unless it is a capital case, this Court will not 
review a lower court's failure to instruct the jury on lesser 
included offenses when such instructions are not requested by the 
defendant. 
Even if this Court chose to review the absence of the 
lesser included offenses instructions, the facts in this case did 
not require that such instructions be given. In State v. Baker, 
671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), this Court explained that lesser 
included offenses instructions are necessary only when there is a 
"rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense". Id. 
at 159, quoting U.C.A. 76-1-402. As is explained in subpoints A 
through E of Point I of this brief, there is no rational basis 
for acquitting Defendant of second degree murder. 
Defendant emphasizes the lack of direct evidence of his 
striking the fatal blow. As this Court stated in State v. Watts, 
675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983) , 
IWle cannot ignore that the pernicious 
acts of the child abuser are always attended 
by secrecy, denied by protestations and 
innocence, and "peculiarly identified by the 
marked discrepancy between the clinical or 
physical findings and the historical data 
-8-
provided by the [ care taker ] .* State v^ 
Tanner, Utah, 675 P.2d 539 (1983). ~Nor are 
we unmindful of the propensity of 
knowledgeable int imates to stand mute for 
reasons known t o them alone. But we have 
s ta ted many times before that c ircumstant ia l 
evidence alone may be competent t o e s t a b l i s h 
the g u i l t of the accused, so long as i t 
excludes every reasonable hypothesis other 
than defendant's g u i l t . 
Id . a t 569. 
The State was bound to show beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Defendant acted with intent or knowledge that his actions 
would kill Ronnie, with intent to cause serious bodily injury 
while committing an act clearly dangerous to human life, or with 
depraved indifference to human life, knowing that his conduct 
created a grave risk of death to another. U.C.A. 76-5-203, State 
Y^-Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Utah 1984). 
The jury specifically found Defendant guilty under 
subsection (c) of 76-5-203(1) in a unanimous special verdict (R. 
169), and this section is the proper one to focus on in this 
appeal. While the State presented no direct evidence of 
Defendants intent, the depraved indifference category of second 
degree murder requires neither direct nor circumstantial showing 
of intent to kill or to cause serious bidily injury. In fentana, 
supra# this Court explained that: 
In contrast to the specific reference to 
"intent" in subsections (a) and (b), Section 
76-5-203(1)(c), • . ., does not specify a 
particular mental state. Its reference to 
•depraved indifference1 does not denote a 
subjective mental state. By their terras and 
their placement, the words "depraved 
-9-
indifference" refer to the objective 
circumstances under which the conduct causing 
the death occurred. 
Id, at 1045. Consistent with this explanation the jury 
instruction which defined depraved indifference in this case 
reads: 
•Depraved indi f ference to human l i f e " : " 
to engage in conduct with a "depraved 
indi f ference to human l i f e " , a person must do 
more than act "reckless ly" but need not have 
the conscious o b j e c t i v e to cause the v i c t i m 1 s 
death. Rather, the greatness of the risk of 
death which the a c t o r ' s ac t ions create and 
the lack of j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the creat ion of 
the risk i s the t e s t t o be applied in making 
such determination i s an o b j e c t i v e standard 
viewed by a reasonable man under such 
circumstances. 
Ins truc t ion 14a, R. 157, 158 . 
Fontana l i s t s the elements that the State must prove in 
order to convict under 76-5-203(1) ( c ) : 
a. The defendant engaged in conduct 
that created a grave risk of death to 
another; and 
2 . At the time he so acted , the 
defendant knew that h i s conduct created a 
grave r isk of death to another; and 
3 . The circumstances under which the 
defendant ac ted , o b j e c t i v e l y viewed by a 
reasonable man rather than s u b j e c t i v e l y by 
the actual s t a t e of defendant's mind, were 
such as to evidence a depraved ind i f f erence 
t o human l i f e ; and 
4 . The defendant thereby unlawfully 
caused the death of another. 
Id , at 1047. A review of the evidence demonstrates that the 
S ta te met t h i s burden, and that the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t was j u s t i f i e d 
- 1 0 -
by the evidence. In reviewing claims of i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence, 
t h i s Court views "the evidence in the l i g h t roost favorable to the 
v e r d i c t , and w i l l i n t e r f e r e only when the evidence i s so lacking 
and insubs tant ia l that a reasonable person could poss ib ly have 
reached a verd ic t beyond a reasonable doubt." §tate_v^_Tanner, 
675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983) . 
Defendant r e l i e s heavi ly on State v . Bols inger , 699 
P.2d 1214 (1985) , a case which i s readi ly d i s t ingu i shab le from 
the case a t hand, through the comparative appl i ca t ion of the 
Fontana depraved ind i f ference t e s t . In jState v. Fontana, 680 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984) t h i s Court approved t h i s jury i n s t r u c t i o n : 
To engage in conduct with a "depraved 
indi f ference to human l i f e , " a person must do 
more than act "reck les s ly ," but he need not 
have as h i s conscious o b j e c t i v e or des i re to 
cause the r e s u l t . Rather, the_greatness_of 
the r isk which the defendant' s a c t i o n s , c r e a t e 
and_the_lack_gf_just i f icat ign_fgr_the 
creat ign_gf_the_risk i s the t e s t t o be 
appl ied in determining whether the 
defendant's conduct evidences a "depraved 
ind i f f erence to human l i f e . " 
fontana at 1047. 
In Bo l s inger , the defendant was charged with second 
degree murder when h i s partner in sexual in tercourse was 
s trangled by h i s pu l l ing on the cord which she t i e d around her 
neck. This Court s e t as ide the v e r d i c t and convicted the 
defendant of manslaughter af ter evaluat ing the u t i l i t y of the act 
i n quest ion (seeking heightened s t imulat ion for a consenting, 
- 1 1 -
participating, and "sexually sophisticated" woman), and the 
defendant's lack of knowledge of the unusual risks of death 
present in the case (s l ight force caused the strangulation, the 
v ict im's inebriation and the defendant's weight on top of her 
increased her vulnerability to strangulation)• 
In the present case, there i s absolutely no u t i l i t y 
that c iv i l i z ed people would recognize in striking a child with or 
against a blunt object with such force as to render the child 
unconscious, and there was no consent or participation on the 
part of the victim. As wi l l be shown in subpoints A through C, 
there i s no way that an adult male could i n f l i c t such destructive 
force upon a defenseless child without understanding the grave 
risk of death involved. 
In reviewing the evidence presented, i t i s helpful to 
follow the analysis provided in State,yff, Watts, 675 P.2d 566 
(Utah 1983) , in which the defendant was convicted of second 
degree murder in the death of his roommate's child. In Watts, 
the jury was asked three questions: 
1) Was [the vict im's] death a homicide 
or was i t an accident? 2) If i t was a 
homicide, who was responsible for the 
ki l l ing? 3) If the defendant was the person 
responsible for the criminal homicide, how 
high was the degree of his culpability?" 
Id. at 570. 
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A. THE SEVERITY OP RONNIE'S INJURIES 
NEGATES THE POSSIBILITY OP ACCIDENT. 
Witnesses a t t e s t e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t Ronnie was b ru i s ed 
when he e n t e r e d t h e Emergency Room (Tr. 105 , 124 ) . Defense 
counsel sought t o minimize t h i s tes t imony by implying t h a t 
Ronn ie ' s b r u i s e s were normal for a t h r e e year o ld or i n f l i c t e d by 
those who t r e a t e d him a f t e r he l e f t Defendant ' s cus tody . Dr. 
Clarke po in t ed ou t t h a t Ronnie ' s b r u i s e s were l o c a t e d on unusual 
a r e a s on h i s body, and t h a t they were i n c o n s i s t e n t wi th t h e 
a c t i v i t i e s of a normal t h r e e year old (Tr. 317) , and c o n s i s t e n t 
wi th c h i l d abuse (318, see a l so 593-594) . Mul t ip l e w i t n e s s e s 
t h a t saw Ronnie when he f i r s t came t o t h e Emergency Room and i n 
l a t e r s t a g e s of h i s t r e a tmen t t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e b r u i s e s were in 
d i f f e r e n t s t a g e s of h e a l i n g (Tr . 124 ) . Thus, some of the b r u i s e s 
n e c e s s a r i l y p reda t ed Ronn ie ' s en t r ance i n t o t h e h o s p i t a l . Dr. 
Clarke t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he performed t h e au topsy , he noted 
s e v e r a l b r u i s e s on Ronn ie ' s arms, l e g s , abdomen, back, neck, and 
head, which were too o ld t o have been i n c u r r e d whi l e Ronnie was 
i n t h e h o s p i t a l (Tr . 314-317, 322 , 4 0 7 ) . The S t a t e p r e sen t ed 
tes t imony t h a t medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s do not normally b r u i s e t h e i r 
p a t i e n t s , and t h a t t h e people who t r e a t e d Ronnie were ca re fu l 
wi th him (Tr . 179) . 
Dr. Clarke t e s t i f i e d t h a t Ronnie had a hemorrhage i n 
h i s s t e r n o c l e i d o m a s t o i d muscle , which i n d i c a t e d t h a t he had 
s u s t a i n e d a s e r i o u s blow t o h i s neck (Tr. 322) • Dr. Clarke 
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explained that the edema (swel l ing) in Ronnie's brain was so 
severe that i t f l a t t ened the normal curves in the brain, and 
forced the brain t o herniate out of the hole from the craniotomy 
and i n t o abnormal port ions of the s k u l l (Tr. 332) . Dr. Walker 
t e s t i f i e d that the force that caused the skul l fracture tore the 
dura mater of the brain, and caused the subdural hemotoma and 
brain edema (Tr. 533 , 5 3 4 ) . 
Ronnie's skul l fracture nearly encompassed h i s e n t i r e 
head, and ran through the th i ckes t part of h i s s k u l l (Tr. 328-
329) . Dr. Walker t e s t i f i e d that the force causing the skul l 
f racture was equivalent t o Ronnie's f a l l i n g from a two to three 
story bui lding onto the back of h i s head (Tr. 5 3 1 ) . 
Returning to the f i r s t quest ion on Watts, "Was Ronnie's 
death a homicide or was i t an accident?"; Ronnie's death 
c e r t i f i c a t e , and the expert testimony of Drs. Clarke and Walker 
prove that h i s death was a homicide; and s ince no acc identa l 
cause would account for the s e v e r i t y of h i s in jury , a human act 
was necessary to account for it. 
B. THE PROGRESSION OP RONNIE'S INJURIES 
INDICATES THAT THE FORCE THAT CAUSED THE 
INJURIES PRECEDED HIS LOSS OP 
CONSCIOUSNESS IMMEDIATELY, AND MUST HAVE 
OCCURRED WHEN RONNIE WAS IN DEPENDANT'S 
CUSTODY. 
Various medical t echnic ians t e s t i f i e d that Ronnie's 
head injury was acute (Tr. 153 , 245, 301 , 406) , meaning severe , 
and recent . Dr. VanNorman t e s t i f i e d that the fresh blood 
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depicted in the CAT scan that was shown t o the jury ind ica te s 
that Ronnie's injury was acute (Tr. 246) . Dr. McCarthy a l so 
pointed out that in h i s opinion the bright red blood that ex i t ed 
the burr hole meant that the injury was acute (Tr. 301) . Dr. 
Clarke t e s t i f i e d that the early s igns of necros i s (brain t i s s u e 
death) where Ronnie's brain herniated out of h i s sku l l showed 
that the injury was acute (Tr. 3 7 0 ) . 
The acuteness of the i n j u r i e s shows that the force 
causing the i n j u r i e s must have immediately preceded Ronnie's 
presentat ion at the Emergency Room. Dr. VanNorman explained that 
Ronnie's r ight eye was d i l a t e d when he entered the h o s p i t a l , and 
that when the l e f t eye became d i l a t e d , i t demonstrated the rapid 
progression of the injury (Tr. 198) . He explained that the 
progression of i n j u r i e s i s often used by doctors to determine the 
cause and timing of i n j u r i e s , and that the progression of 
Ronnie's i n j u r i e s ind icated that h i s injury occurred short ly 
before he was operated on (Tr. 2 3 2 ) r and "minutes t o hours" 
before he was brought t o the Dixie Medical Center (Tr. 199) . Dr. 
Walker a l so t e s t i f i e d that the progression of d i l a t i o n i n 
Ronnie's eyes ind icated that the injury was recent and rapidly 
progressing (Tr. 5 4 7 ) . 
Dr. Walker explained that the force causing Ronnie's 
i n j u r i e s would have caused immediate unconsciousness (Tr. 534) . 
Dr. Clarke t e s t i f i e d that the condit ion of the hemotoma at the 
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time of the autopsy indicated that i t immediately preceded 
Ronnie's unconsciousness, and was probably incurred on May 5 (Tr. 
3 3 6 ) , the date on which Ronnie was in Defendant's custody. Dr. 
Walker t e s t i f i e d that Ronnie must have incurred h i s i n j u r i e s 
af ter he got off the phone with h i s mother, because the i n j u r i e s 
would have resu l t ed i n an immediate l o s s of consciousness and 
breathing d i f f i c u l t i e s (Tr, 552) and would have made i t 
impossible for the ch i ld t o have conversed normally with anyone. 
Returning t o the second Watts quest ion; "If i t was a 
homicide, who was respons ib le for the k i l l i n g ? " ; the expert 
testimony of Drs. Walker, Clarke, VanNorman, and McCarthy proves 
that Ronnie's f a t a l injury was incurred during the time that 
Defendant, by h i s own admission (Tr. 754-812) had s o l e custody of 
him. As i n Watts, the f a c t s that defendant was the e x c l u s i v e 
caretaker of the v i c t im during the time when the injury must have 
occurred, that evidence supported the conclusion that he was l e s s 
than happy with that r o l e , that there was evidence of a prior 
l o s s of consciousness whi le Ronnie was in Defendant's care (Tr. 
6 7 0 ) , and that expert wi tnesses t e s t i f i e d that the f a t a l i n j u r i e s 
were i n f l i c t e d by massive force within the range of Defendant's 
a b i l i t y , show that Defendant was respons ib le for the homicide. 
Compare Watts a t 570. 
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C. NO ADULT COOLD APPLY THE TREMENDOUS 
FORCE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE TO A THREE 
YEAR OLD CHILD WITHOUT KNOWING THAT SDCH 
CONDUCT INVOLVED A GRAVE RISK OP DEATH. 
The expert testimony noted above explained that the 
trauma causing Ronnie's i n j u r i e s was extreme. Part icu lar ly in 
considerat ion of Defendant's prior experience with Ronnie (Tr. 
670) , and of Defendant's professed extens ive experience with 
young chi ldren (Tr. 720) , he must have understood the gravity of 
the risk involved in injur ing Ronnie. In Katts , the Court 
deferred t o the judgement of the jurors in t h e i r s e l e c t i o n of the 
defendant's c u l p a b i l i t y (Watts quest ion 3 ) , s t a t i n g : 
I t may well have been convinced that the 
defendant's conduct exhib i ted a depraved 
mind, inflamed t o such a degree that i t 
appeared to be i n d i f f e r e n t to the l i f e or 
safe ty of t h i s child—making him g u i l t y of 
murder in the second degree under the c o u r t ' s 
i n s t r u c t i o n . • . 
Id . a t 571. 
D. THE INCONSISTENCIES AND INADEQUACIES OP 
DEPENDANT'S EXPLANATIONS POR RONNIE'S 
INJURIES ARE CIRCUMSTANTIAL PROOF OF 
DEPENDANT'S GUILT. 
Defense counsel presented f i v e p o s s i b l e explanations 
for Ronnie's condi t ion: h i s f a l l a t the dam four days prior to 
h i s enter ing the hosp i ta l (687) r h i s f a l l at play school two days 
prior t o h i s enter ing the h o s p i t a l (Tr. 641) , h i s f a l l on cement 
one week before he entered the hosp i ta l (Tr. 709)
 r h i s habit of 
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h i t t i n g h i s head on the f loor i n t e n t i o n a l l y (Tr. 635, 5 8 3 ) , and 
the combination of the above occurrences. 
Defendant gave numerous vers ions of Ronnie's f a l l at 
the dam. When Defendant ta lked to the Washington p o l i c e o f f i c e r 
Chandler, he claimed that Ronnie incurred a s l i g h t abrasion on 
h i s forehead (Tr. 440) . When he talked to Washington p o l i c e 
o f f i c e r Al l sop , he claimed that he had not not iced any head 
injury from the f a l l a t the dam (Tr. 460) . Defendant's employer, 
Garland Turner, t e s t i f i e d that Defendant t o l d him on the way to 
Ronnie's funeral that when Ronnie f e l l a t the dam, he l i t on h i s 
head, and the sound of the impact prompted Defendant to take 
Ronnie to a doctor, who warned Defendant to watch for s igns of 
concussion (Tr. 6 1 1 ) . In Defendant's test imony, he reported that 
he did not see Ronnie h i t h i s head at the dam, but there was a 
scrape on the s ide of h i s head (Tr. 689)• 
Dr. VanNorraan t e s t i f i e d that the acuteness of the 
injury ruled out the p o s s i b i l i t y that Ronnie could have sustained 
i t four days before entering the h o s p i t a l , par t i cu lar ly in l i g h t 
of Ronnie's normal behavior between the f a l l at the dam and h i s 
entrance i n t o the h o s p i t a l (Tr. 206) . In h i s interview with a 
Washington p o l i c e o f f i c e , Dr. VanNorman explained that a person 
could not maintain consciousness with the degree of brain 
swe l l ing present in Ronnie's head, and that i t was unl ike ly that 
the swe l l ing developed as a r e s u l t of the a l l eged injury four 
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days e a r l i e r (Tr. 251-252) • Dr. McCarthy rejected the f a l l a t 
the dam explanation (Tr. 283). 
Attendants a t the nursery school t e s t i f i e d t h a t Ronnie 
did not f a l l while he was in t he i r care (Tr. 489, 503, 512), and 
t h a t nothing unusual was recorded about Ronnie's v i s i t in t he 
school records kept to monitor such events , because nothing 
unusual happened to Ronnie while he was a t the school (Tr. 491)• 
Dr. McCarthy t e s t i f i e d tha t even if the f a l l off of the swing had 
ac tua l ly occurred, i t would not explain Ronnie's severe i n ju r i e s 
(Tr. 283). Miake Nichols es tab l i shed tha t any al leged f a l l must 
have preceded the taking of photographs, since Ronnie played 
outside only before the photos were taken. S ta tes Exhibit No. 1. 
Like the explanations of the f a l l s a t the dam and a t 
the play school , Defendant's explanation about Ronnie's f a l l i n g 
on the cement one week pr ior to h i s admission in the hospi ta l was 
not corroborated by independent evidence (Tr. 709). While t h i s 
explanation did not surface un t i l Defendant's cross-examination 
during Defendant's case in chief, medical testimony explaining 
t h a t Ronnie's i n j u r i e s would have caused immediate 
unconsciousness (Tr. 552) rebuts t h i s explanat ion. 
Dr. Walker indicated t h a t in h i s experience with over 
one thousand pa t i en t s f a l l i n g from heights such as those provided 
in Defendant's explanat ions , none of them had i n j u r i e s as 
extensive as Ronnie's (Tr. 578), and tha t people in h i s 
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profess ion agreed that t h i s type of injury does not occur without 
v i o l e n t force (Tr. 579) . 
The explanation that Ronnie habi tua l ly h i t h i s head on 
the ground was provided by Mrs. DeMille (Tr. 635, 583) . 
Defendant f a i l e d t o mention t h i s phenomena to the p o l i c e (Tr. 
770 ) , and discussed i t only when he was asked to during the 
cross-examination (Tr. 7 7 0 ) . Dr. Walker t e s t i f i e d that Ronnie 
could not have i n f l i c t e d h i s i n j u r i e s upon himself (Tr. 535) . 
Dr. VanNorman t e s t i f i e d tha t f while i t was p o s s i b l e for 
the fracture and the edema (brain swel l ing) t o have come from 
separate blows, each of the two i n j u r i e s was caused by one blow 
(Tr. 237) . Likewise, Dr. Walker t e s t i f i e d that Ronnie's i n j u r i e s 
were not caused by mult ip le blows (Tr. 535, 5 9 1 ) . 
Ronnie's a c t i v i t i e s during the week before h i s entrance 
to the emergency room on Sunday ind ica te that the events 
described in Defendant's explanations did not cause the f a t a l 
in jury . On Friday n ight , af ter the three a l l eged f a l l s , and 
after the habitual head banging, Ronnie was laughing, dancing for 
Defendant's fr iends and jumping on t h e i r laps (Tr. 6 4 2 ) . On 
Sunday, May 5 th , Ronnie ate breakfast and lunch (Tr. 763 , 7 7 4 ) , 
helped Defendant mow the lawn (Tr. 7 6 6 ) , played with h i s toys 
(Tr. 7 6 5 ) , and c a l l e d h i s mother a t 2:15 or 2:30 p.m. (Tr. 7 8 5 ) , 
a t which time he sounded normal to her (Tr. 6 4 5 ) . Defendant's 
testimony ind ica ted that immediately before the phone c a l l t o h i s 
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mother, Ronnie's e y e s , speech, movement and mood were normal (Tr. 
781-782) . Ronnie was admitted at 3:15 p.m. to Dixie Medical 
Center in the unconscious condit ion which u l t imate ly led t o h i s 
death (Tr. 104 ) . 
Al l of these a c t i v i t i e s are cons i s tent with the medical 
evidence that Ronnie was not f a t a l l y injured e a r l i e r in the week. 
Had Ronnie susta ined the f a t a l injury e a r l i e r , he would not have 
appeared as he did (healthy and happy) in the photograph, taken 
at the play school on Friday (Tr. 549) ( S t a t e ' s Exhibit No. 1 ) , 
and could not even have spoken t o h i s mother on the phone (Tr. 
552) . 
The i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s and inadequacies of Defendant's 
explanat ions are c ircumstantial evidence of h i s g u i l t . The 
descr ip t ions of Ronnie's a c t i v i t i e s that are provided in the 
explanations combine with the expert medical testimony to prove 
that Ronnie susta ined h i s f a t a l injury in the time frame between 
Ronnie's telephone c a l l t o h i s mother, inquiring when she would 
return home, and Defendant's c a l l to Ronnie's mother, informing 
her that "something" was wrong with Ronnie (Tr. 646) . 
In that time frame, Defendant had complete and s o l e 
custody of Ronnie. While Defendant argues that the S t a t e ' s lack 
of d i rec t evidence of the f a t a l blow n e c e s s i t a t e s that the State 
disprove every hypothesis of innocence ( i . e . that Defendant 
a c c i d e n t a l l y threw Ronnie in the a i r , that Defendant was 
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temporarily insane), none of these hypotheses were presented in 
Defendant's testimony, and the State has no duty to rebut them. 
B. THE STATE PRESENTED ADDITIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OP DEPENDANT'S 
GUILT. 
Drs. McCarthy and Walker t e s t i f i e d that an adult could 
have caused Ronnie's i n j u r i e s (Tr. 270, 538) . In October of 
1984, when Ronnie l o s t consciousness when he was in Defendant's 
custody, h i s mother suspected that Defendant had hurt him (Tr. 
678 ) . At the time of Ronnie's f a t a l injury, Defendant was under 
s t r e s s : Ronnie had chicken pox (Tr. 724) , and a l l eged ly had been 
vomiting and s ick in t ermi t t en t ly during the days before Ronnie's 
death (Tr. 695 ) . The night before Ronnie's death, Defendant 
d idn' t s l e e p much (Tr. 7 5 7 ) , and on the day of Ronnie's death, 
the lawnmower broke (Tr. 763) . Defendant's back was injured (Tr. 
7 2 6 ) , h i s time off of work re su l t ed in a l o s s of income (Tr. 
7 2 7 ) , and being home babys i t t ing Ronnie for two weeks (Tr. 726 ) . 
He and Ronnie's mother were having f inanc ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s (Tr. 
744) - her job was more regular than Defendant's, and she was 
paying most of the b i l l s (Tr. 7 4 8 ) . Ronnie's mother's schedule 
was d i f f i c u l t , and often l e f t Defendant and Ronnie together on 
weekends, without her (Tr. 7 4 1 ) . 
Defendant and Ronnie's mother were considering 
Defendant's moving out of the house (Tr. 7 4 4 ) . Ronnie's mother 
wrote l e t t e r s t o Defendant, one on April 30 , s t a t i n g "Please 
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just remember I love you. I don't know what I ' l l do about 
Ronnie. The only thing I can think of i s to send him away. I'm 
one hel l of a mother aren't I ," and one on May 1, stating "I know 
a l o t of the problem has been Ronnie in the pain you've been 
fee l ing . Ronnie loves you even though he whines and cr i e s . He 
loves you. He just t r i e s so hard to win your approval and 
affection." (Tr. 675-677) Defendant admitted that prior to 
Ronnie's death, Defendant had wondered about what l i f e would be 
l ike without Ronnie (Tr. 740) , and that he knew that to "take" 
Ronnie's mother, he'd have to "take" Ronnie too. (Tr. 751) 
According to Defendant's own testimony, when Ronnie 
passed out, Defendant did not rush to seek medical assistance. 
He took Ronnie's clothes off, put him in the tub and sprinkled 
him with water (Tr. 699), then dried him off and put fresh 
clothes on him before he even called the chi ld ' s mother (Tr. 
699). While Defendant called Ronnie's mother at work where she 
was a police dispatcher, he did not t e l l her to send an ambulance 
(Tr. 807), but asked instead, "When do you get off?" (Tr. 646). 
Ronnie's death was not accidental. It was a homicide. 
The force that caused Ronnie's fatal injuries was applied when 
Defendant had so le custody of Ronnie. The extreme force which 
caused Ronnie's extensive injuries involved a grave risk, if not 
a certainty, of death, which risk any adult would have to 
understood when applying such force. Defendant's explanations 
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for Ronnie1s injuries are inconsistent with the physical findings 
of the medical experts. While Defendant presented multiple 
witnesses to a t tes t to the fact that his relationship with Ronnie 
appeared to be a loving one, the State presented evidence that 
Defendant was under a great deal of s tress and unhappy about 
l iv ing with Ronnie when the accident occurred. 
Viewing t h i s evidence in the l ight most favorable to 
the jury's guilty verdict , th is Court should uphold Defendant's 
conviction of second degree murder. 
POINT II 
THE GARNER AFFIDAVIT IS NOT COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE, AND EVEN IF IT WERE, THE CONTENTS 
OF THE AFFIDAVIT DO NOT MERIT A NEW TRIAL. 
A. DEFENDANT DID NOT SUBMIT QUESTIONS 
DURING VOIR DIRE, AND WAIVED HIS 
OPPORTUNITY TO CHALLENGE THE JURORS. 
In Point II of Defendant's Brief, he argues that his 
trial in the district court did not meet constitutional standards 
because of unrevealed juror biases and juror misconduct during 
deliberations. In flaltby y. Cox Const...Co.
 ff Inc. , 598 P.2d 336, 
341 (Utah) cert, denied, 444 U.S. 945 (1979), this Court held 
that: 
"Imlatters of possible bias and 
prejudice on the part of the jury are within 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and 
its rulings on whether to question veniremen 
with respect thereto will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless it is demonstrated that the 
Court abused its discretion,: 
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U.C.A, 78-35-18, Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, provides in subsection (b) that: 
Itlhe court may permit counsel or the 
defendant to conduct the examination of the 
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 
examination. In the latter event, the court 
may permit counsel or the defendant to 
supplement the examination by such further 
inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself 
submit to the prospective jurors additional 
questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant. 
Defendant was given the opportunity to discover the alleged 
biases of the jurors during voir dire. After Judge Burns 
questioned the prospective jurors, counsel for Defendant was 
asked if he would like to pose questions to the jurors, and he 
declined (Tr. 70) • 
Defendant should have inquired further of the jurors or 
objected to their participation before he passed them for cause 
(Tr. 75)• Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
U.C.A. 77-35-12, provides in subsection (d) that: 
Failure of the defendant to timely raise 
defenses or objections or to make requests 
which must be made prior to trial or at the 
time set by the court shall constitute waiver 
thereof, but the court for cause shown may 
grant relief from such waiver. 
This Court relied on this statute in State y3 filler, 674 P.2d 
130 (Utah 1983), when the defense objected to the inadequacy of 
the voir dire in the proceedings below: 
The next claim is that the judge erred 
in failing to inquire to the jurors if they 
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would be prejudice in their minds because the 
case involved motorcycle clubs such as the 
•Sundowners." The defense conceded the fact 
that the court may have forgotten to inquire. 
Counsel neither objected, reminded the judge 
of the oversightr made a new request, nor 
asked permission personally to voir dire the 
jury under U.C.A., 1953f Section 77-35-18(b). 
Such failure effectively waived the error 
under U.C.A., 1953, Section 77-35-12(d). 
B. THE GARNER AFFIDAVIT IS INCOMPETENT 
EVIDENCE. 
Defendant sought to substantiate his claims of juror 
bias and misconduct by submitting an affidavit of one of the 
jurors. The trial court properly excluded the affidavit, citing 
U.R. E. 606(b), and denied Defendant's motion for a new trial, 
which was based wholly on the affidavit. Utah Rules of Evidence 
606(b), adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) verbatim. It 
states: 
Upon an inquiry into the v a l i d i t y of a 
v e r d i c t or indictment, a juror may not 
t e s t i f y as t o any matter or statement 
occurring during the course of the j u r y ' s 
de l ibera t ions or to the e f f e c t of anything 
upon h i s or any other j u r o r ' s mind or 
emotions as inf luencing him to assent t o or 
d i s s en t from the verd ic t or indictment or 
concerning h i s mental processes in connection 
therewith, except that a juror may t e s t i f y on 
the quest ion whether extraneous pre jud ic ia l 
information was improperly brought to the 
j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n or whether any outs ide 
in f luence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror. Nor may h i s a f f i d a v i t or evidence 
of any statement by him concerning a matter 
about which he would be precluded from 
t e s t i f y i n g be rece ived for these purposes. 
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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion to 
explain the application of P.R.E. 606(b) in Gulf^Life-lDSx^o^y^ 
folsom, 806 F.2d 225 (11th Cir. 1986). In Qulf_Life, a juror 
submitted an affidavit claiming that she had failed to understand 
the jury instructions and had been unduly influenced by the other 
jurors in reaching her decision to convict the defendant of 
assault. In rejecting the defendant's attempt at impeaching the 
verdict, the court emphasized that: 
lilt is settled law that juror testimony 
is inadmissible to impeach a verdictr except 
where the proffered testimony relates to 
"whether extraneous prejudicial information" 
or any "outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror." 
Id. at 225, n. 2 (citations omitted, emphasis original). See 
also United States vy Jelsma, 630 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1980) 
(several juror affidavits offered to show that the jurors were 
confused during deliberations and that the verdict did not 
reflect their understanding of the law were not admitted); United 
States v. Brooks. 677 P.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (defendant, 
convicted of first degree murder by overwhelming evidence, was 
not allowed to overturn the verdict because one of the jurors did 
not realize until after the trial had begun that he had regularly 
made casual observations of defendant in a laundromat before the 
trial)• 
Courts that have interpreted F.R. E. 606(b) have not 
differentiated between the phrases "outside influence" and 
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•extraneous prejudicial information", but use either or both in 
circumstances where the verdict may be prejudiced by the jurors1 
contact with non-jurors and prejudicial information about the 
case that was not presented in the court room. For example, in 
HjJ*_v._Greer, 620 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1983) , the court did not 
specify which phrase justified the admission of a juror affidavit 
testifying that a marshal (non-juror) approached him and offered 
an opinion about the potential sentence for the defendant. In 
UJLSi_y.._Brooks, 677 P.2d 907 (1982) , the court explained the 
policy behind 606(b) and the "improper influence" exceptions: 
The purpose . . . is to preserve the 
integrity of jury deliberations by confining 
claims of error to events or conditions that 
are "improperly brought to the jury's 
attention" and involve a calculated, 
intentional attempt to affect their outcome. 
Id. at 914 (emphasis original, citations omitted). 
These cases do not admit evidence of the personal 
knowledge held by jurors when the trials began, but admit only 
evidence of extrajudical information that cames to the jurors 
during the course of the trial. See also Wiser v. People, 732 
P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1987) (affidavit testifying of juror 
consultation of dictionary and legal secretary was permitted as 
the exposition of "extraneous information or influence" under 
O.R. E. 606(b), which is identical to F.R. E. 606(b)); £tate_yJL 
plackwell, 664 S.W. 2d 686 (Tenn. 1984) (affidavit testifying 
that a witness* mother told the juror that the defendant was 
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guil ty was competent evidence of "outside improper influence" and 
"extraneous prejudicial information", while testimony that jurors 
discussed defendant's race during the deliberations was 
incompetent under the Tennessee equivalent of F.R.E. 606(b)); 
fiulf_Life_Ins^_Co^yx_folsomr 806 F.2d 225 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(affidavit of juror's second thoughts after being influenced by 
the other jurors in the deliberations did not deal with 
"•external1 interference with the deliberative process", and was 
barred by F.R.E. 606(b)) . 
The Utah Supreme first addressed the issue of verdict 
impeachment through juror affidavits in Ifeople vy plynn, 26 P. 
1114 (Utah 1891), in which it was stated: 
It is well settled that affidavits of 
jurors will not be received to impeach or 
question their verdict, nor to show the 
grounds upon which it was rendered, nor to 
show their misunderstanding of fact or law, 
nor that they misunderstood the charge of the 
court, or the effect of their verdict, nor 
their opinions, surmises, and processes of 
reasoning in arriving at a verdict. 
Id. at 1116. UcDgnald_y^_£less, 238 U.S. 264 (1914) explained 
the policy reason for barring juror affidavits from impeaching 
verdicts, by predicting the state of affairs that would result if 
affidavits were allowed to impeach the verdicts: 
Jurors would be harassed and beset by 
the defeated party in an effort to secure 
from them evidence of facts which might 
establish misconduct sufficient to set aside 
a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be 
thus used, the result would be to make what 
was intended to be a private deliberation, 
the constant subject of public 
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investigation—to the restriction of all 
frankness and freedom of discussion and 
conference. 
Id. at 267. 
In Wheat, v, Denver, 250 P.2d 932 (Utah 1952) , cert 
deniedr 346 U.S. 896 (1953) the Court was working under U.R.C.P. 
59, which limited the admission of juror affidavits to cases 
involving bribery and chance. The Court explained the reasons 
for respecting the sanctity of jury deliberations: 
To permit litigants to get jurors to 
sign affidavits or testify to matters 
discussed in connection with their functions 
as jurors would open the door to inquiry into 
all matter of things which a losing litigant 
might consider improper; misconceptions of 
evidence or law, offers of settlement, 
personal experiences, prejudice against 
litigants or their causes or the classes to 
which they belong. It would be an 
interminable and totally impracticable 
process. Such post mortems would be 
productive of no end of mischief and render 
service as a juror unbearable. If jurors 
were so circumscribed in their deliberations, 
it is likely that judge and counsel would 
have to be present in the jury room 
attempting to monitor and regulate their 
thought and discussions into approved 
channels. 
Id. at 937. Flynn and Hheat were both cited with approval and 
quoted in gtate yy,Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981). gee also 
£osenlof_Y<L_£U1 1 iyan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983) (defendant barred 
from submitting a juror affidavit of mathematical error that 
occurred when the damages were decided by the jury); Qroen v. 
Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983) (six juror affidavits were 
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not admitted to show that the jurors did not understand that 
insurance would compensate the victim); gm^t^Vy parnett, 408 
P.2d 709 (Utah 1965) (three juror affidavits of an unauthorized 
test by a juror, which test was the basis for the decision, were 
not admitted); gtringham vf Broderick, 529 P.2d 425 (Utah 1974) 
(five juror affidavits not admitted to show that the jury did not 
understand the jury instructions); Johnson y. Simons, 551 P.2d 
515 (Utah 1976) (Juror affidavits not admitted to show that the 
jury misunderstood the jury instructions and disregarded the law 
in reaching their decision). 
The affidavit offered by Defendant alleges juror bias 
(juror previously married to, but not "a fortiorari a victim of" 
(Appellant's Brief 28) a child and spouse abuser, juror with 
experience working with abused children, juror knowledge of the 
location of Defendant's residence and knowledge of "what was 
going on"), juror impropriety (juror resorting to prayer, 
discussion of juror religious affiliation), and improper 
consideration during deliberations (juror consideration of 
autism, juror concern for health of jurors). 
None of the allegations made in the affidavit describe 
a verdict that was reached by bribery or by chance, or constitute 
proof of extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence. 
They describe the mental processes and deliberations of the jury, 
and are not competent to impeach the verdict, as is shown by 
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State_yxjgge, 498 P.2d 662 (Utah 1972) • In gee, juror affidavits 
showing that jurors concurred in the verdict because of their 
discussion of the defendant's failure to take the stand were not 
admitted because: 
the testimony did not relate to 
extrinsic misconduct, that is, to physical 
facts, conditions or activities which might 
have a bearing upon or which might influence 
the jury in its determination of guilt or 
innocence, (Rule 44, U.R.E.) The testimony 
related solely to the discussions and 
reasoning process by means of which the jury 
arrived at its verdict. This evidence was 
inadmissible for the purpose of impugning the 
verdict, and should have been excluded at the 
hearing of defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
C. EVEN IF THE AFFIDAVIT WERE ADMISSIBLE, 
IT DOES NOT DESCRIBE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT 
WOULD SUPPORT CHALLENGING THE JURORS FOR 
CAUSE IMPEACHING THEIR VERDICT. 
Even if the affidavit were accepted as competent 
evidence, and if the allegations posed therein were true, none of 
the allegations included in it constitute grounds for challenging 
the jurors for cause or for impeaching their verdict. 
Valid challenges for cause are listed in subsection (3) 
of Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 78-35-18: 
(e) The challenge for cause is an 
objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following rounds: 
(1) Want of any of the qualifications 
prescribed by law; 
(2) ftny mgntal or physical infirmity 
which renders one incapable of performing the 
duties of,a juror; 
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(3) Consanguinity or affinity within 
the fourth degree to the person alleged to be 
injured by the offense charged, or on whose 
complaint the prosecution was instituted; 
(4) The existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, 
witness or person alleged to have been 
victimized or injured by the defendant, which 
relationship when viewed objectively, would 
suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which would be 
free of favoritism. A prospective juror 
shall not be disqualified solely because he 
is indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(5) Having been or being the party 
adverse to the defendant in a civil action, 
or having complained against or having been 
accused by him in a criminal prosecution; 
(6) Having served on the grand jury 
which found the indictment; 
(7) Having served on a trial jury which 
has tried an other person for the particular 
offense charged; 
(8) Having been one of a jury formally 
sworn to try the same charge, and whose 
verdict was set aside, or which was 
discharged without a verdict after the case 
was submitted to it; 
(9) Having served as a juror in a civil 
action brought against the defendant for the 
act charged as an offense; 
(10) If the offense charged is 
punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions abut the death 
penalty as would preclude the juror from 
voting to impose the death penalty following 
conviction regardless of the facts; 
(11) Because he is or, within one year 
preceding, has been engaged or interested in 
carrying on any business, calling or 
employment, the carrying on of which is a 
violation of law, where defendant is charged 
with a like offense; 
(12) Because he has been a witness, 
either for or against the defendant on the 
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preliminary examination or before the grand 
jury; 
113) Having formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether 
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
offense charged; or 
1141 That a state of mind exists on the 
part of_the juror with,reference to the 
cause, or to either party,_ which will prevent 
him from acting impartially andwithout 
prejudice to the substantialrights of the 
party challenging; but no personshall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such iuryt 
founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfagtorily^appears to_the court, that the 
juror can and, will, notwithstanding such 
opinion/ act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
1. "Juror Bias". 
Defendants allegations of juror bias demonstrating 
that one of the jurors had been married to a spouse and child 
abuser and that one of the jurors had worked with abused 
children, even if truef do not show that the jurors had formed 
unqualified opinions about Defendant's guiltf or held states of 
mind which prevented their impartial consideration of the case* 
Although the challenges for cause were listed in a 
different statutory format in State yt Baran, 474 P.2d 729 (Utah 
1970), this Court demonstrated that allegations that prospective 
jury members have had similar experiences to those being 
litigated and allegations that prospective jury members are 
acquainted with the facts of the case do not constitute bias that 
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alone justifies dismissing jurors for cause. £ar*D w a s a robbery 
case, and the facts that: 
•eight members lof the jury] had been 
victims of a robbery, two had previously read 
about defendant in the newspaper, one had 
served on a jury in 1954 on a robbery case, 
and one lived in the same neighborhood as 
defendant's estranged wife" 
did not justify challenging the jurors for cause, because the 
jurors indicated that they held no bias or prejudice against the 
defendant. Id. at 730. 
In State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 1984), defendants 
were convicted of distribution of a controlled substance. On 
appeal, they contended that when the judge in the lower court 
denied their challenge for cause of two of the jurors, the judge 
denied them a fair trial. One of the jurors had training in the 
army in drug abuse, and participated in investigations of drug 
distribution, and was also acquainted with one of the detectives 
in the case, but because the juror stated that he could try the 
case impartially, the challenge for cause against him was rightly 
denied. 
If the jurors in the present case were indeed told that 
one of the jury members knew where the defendant lived and "knew 
exactly what was going on", such information was certainly not an 
independent basis for convicting defendant, in light of the 
overwhelming evidence of his guilt presented at trial. There is 
no way for the reviewing Court to interpret the ambiguity of the 
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above-mentioned statement, or to know if the juror was convinced 
of defendant's guilt by the evidence presented at trial, or by 
her acquaintance with the location of his residence. The 
statement serves to demonstrate one more reason for excluding 
evidence of jury deliberations - the reviewing court has no 
demeanor evidence or contextual basis for interpreting the 
comments that allegedly were uttered by the jurors. 
In Hathaway v. Marx, 439 P.2d 850, (Utah 1968), an 
appeal from a civil trial finding no negligence on the part of 
the defendant, this Court refused to give credence to the 
plaintiff's contention that the jury foreman stated during 
deliberations of the jury that he was present at the scene of the 
accident after it happened, and saw one of the defense witnesses 
there. This Court refused her contention for two reasons: 
First, there [was] no competent proof 
that the alleged misconduct happened at all. 
Second, with very limited exceptions, the 
conduct and deliberations in the jury room 
cannot be impeached. 
Id. at 851 (footnote omitted). 
In C.RjL_Owneg..Trucking Corporation v. Stewart, 509 P.2d 
821 (Utah 1973), a negligence case, this Court explained that 
acquaintance with the defendant is not cause for dismissing a 
prospective juror. The court below "was careful to exclude from 
the panel veniremen who indicated bias or prejudice in favor of 
the defendant or who indicated a desire to be excused from 
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s i t t i n g on the case*, and th i s action was held to be an adequate 
safeguard of the p l a i n t i f f ' s r ights . Id. at 822. 
Even in cases where there i s information interjected 
into the realm of the jury by non-jurors during the t r i a l , such 
information does not just i fy impeachment of the jury verdict when 
the jurors commit to rendering an impartial verdict and when the 
extraneous information i s not different from the evidence 
presented at t r i a l . In Stately.jyelasguezy 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 
1983) t h i s Court upheld the verdict of a jury, when two jurors 
disobeyed court orders to avoid media coverage of the case, and 
stated: 
In the instant case, both jurors who 
disobeyed the court's order stated to the 
court that their exposure to the newspaper 
ar t i c l e s would not influence their ab i l i ty to 
render an impartial verdict and that the 
ar t ic les did not present any information that 
they had not already learned from the 
presentation of the evidence. 
Id. at 1263. £ee also Gee v. Smith, 541 P.2d 6 (Utah 1975) (the 
fact that a juror was present when non-jurors were viewing a 
photograph of the deceased victim was not prejudicial because 
there had been several photographs of the deceased presented at 
t r i a l ) ; pnited gtates v t fteiner, 5 7 8 F # 2d 757 (9th Cir. 1978), 
cert denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978) (the facts that two jurors were 
present on an elevator and heard a discussion between prosecuting 
attorney and witness which contained no prejudicial information, 
and that one juror was told by the ba i l i f f that the judge would 
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like a verdict did not justify overturning the verdict convicting 
the defendants of securities fraud); Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 
1139 (Colo, 1987) (juror consultation of dictionary and juror 
inquiry to legal secretary about the source of jury instructions 
did not merit overturning the guilty verdict of burglary and 
felony menacing)• 
Judge Burns repeatedly asked the jurors during voir 
dire if they could render an impartial verdict, (Tr. 26, 31, 36, 
39, 41,47, 48, 50, 52, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63), and reminded them 
of their duty to do so at numerous points during the trial (Tr. 
134, 253, 433, 468, 598, 710, 826) and in the jury instructions 
at the close of the case. (R. 141, 142, 145, 149, 151, 155, 
163). 
The jury was properly instructed to presume defendant 
innocent, and to appreciate the state's burden of proof. 
Instruction No. 10 (R. 151) reads: 
A defendant in a criminal action is 
presumed to be innocent until the contrary is 
proved and if there is a reasonable doubt as 
to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to an acquittal. The effect 
of this presumption is to place upon the 
State the burden of proving him guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. However, the presumption 
of innocence follows him throughout the trial 
until the State has met its burden. 
To warrant your conviction of the 
defendant, the evidence must, to your minds, 
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other 
than that of the guilt of the defendant. 
That is to say, if, after a complete 
consideration and comparison of all the 
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testimony in the case, you can reasonably 
explain the fac ts given in evidence on any 
reasonable ground other than the g u i l t of the 
defendant, you should acqui t him. 
Likewise, Ins t ruc t ion No. 12 (R. 153) ind ica tes t h a t : 
If the evidence in t h i s case i s 
suscept ib le of two construct ions or 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , each of which appears to you 
to be reasonable and one of which points to 
the g u i l t of the defendant, while the other 
points t o h i s innocence, i t i s your duty 
under the law to adopt tha t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
which wi l l admit to the defendant 's innocence 
and r e j ec t t ha t which points to his g u i l t . 
2 . "Juror Impropriety". 
Defendant's object ions to one j u r o r 1 s resor t ing to 
prayer , and t o eleven of the twelve ju ro r s sharing the same 
r e l i g ion imply three th ings : tha t the praying j u r o r ' s 
" reve la t ion" , and not the evidence, convinced her of Defendant's 
g u i l t , t ha t her " revela t ion" doc t r ina l ly mandated tha t the other 
ten L.D.S. ju rors convict Defendant, and t h a t the eleven L.D.S. 
j u ro r s int imidated the twelfth juror i n to accepting the gu i l ty 
ve rd ic t . There i s no competent proof to support any of these 
impl ica t ions , and search for such proof would v i o l a t e Ar t ic le I , 
Section 4 of the Utah Const i tu t ion, which s t a t e s in p a r t , t h a t : 
The r igh t s of conscience sha l l never be 
infr inged. The Sta te sha l l make no law 
respect ing an establishment of r e l ig ion or 
prohib i t ing the free exercise thereof; no 
r e l ig ious t e s t sha l l be required as a 
qua l i f i ca t ion for any office of public t r u s t 
or for any vote a t any e l ec t i on ; nor sha l l 
any person be incompetent as amwitness pg juror on account of re^igipus^belief or the 
absence thereof. 
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In conformity with the Constitution, U.C.A. 78-46-3 provides that 
Ma] citizen shall not be excluded or exempt from jury service on 
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or 
economic status." 
This Court has had the opportunity to discuss 
allegations against jurors similar to those raised by Defendant 
on two prior occasions. In State vy Piepenberg, 602 P.2d 702 
(Utah 1979), the defendant was charged with violation of 
pornography laws, and on appeal, claimed that his trial was 
unfair, by virtue of the fact that several of the jurors admitted 
on voir dire that they were L.D.S. and that their church had 
taken a position against pornography. Because the jurors were 
not challenged by the defendant during the jury selection 
process, the judge had no opportunity to rule on the bias, and 
this Court held that the opportunity to rule on the bias, and 
this Court held that the defendant had waived his right to object 
to the service of the jurors. The facts of the present case 
parallel those in Piepenberg because Defendant here, while aware 
of the religious affiliations of many of the prospective jurors 
(Tr. 32, 39, 58, 66), failed to object to their service, and 
passed the jurors for cause (Tr. 75) . 
In gtate v. Darrow, 475 P.2d 541 (Utah 1970) , a case in 
which the defendant was convicted of gaining money from the 
L.D.S. church through forgery, the defendant appealed the guilty 
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verdict because s ix of the eight jurors were L.D.S. This Court 
noted that the jurors had indicated that church membership would 
not bias their verdict , and th i s Court rejected the defendant's 
"ipse d ix i t that impute Id] to every Mormon, or for that matter, 
every Catholic, every Protestant, and every Jew, ad infinitum, a 
congenital, ingrained or adopted dishonesty where his church's 
property and his own property are involved*" Id. at 542. While 
the present case does not involve a crime against the L.D.S. 
church, defendant's contention i s l ike that in Darrow, because i t 
imputes non sequitur characterist ics to those of a particular 
religious fai th (e .g . members of the L.D.S. church "notoriously 
rely on 'revelation'" (Appellant's Brief 24) , and thus impliedly 
disregard the evidence presented at t r i a l , ) and attempts to 
disqualify them from jury service on rel igious grounds, in 
contravention of the Utah Constitution. 
In explaining the reasons for rejecting such 
contentions, th is Court emphasized in parrow that the verdict was 
unanimous, and pointed out that the verdict forced the 
defendant's argument to one of three logical conclusions: 
that the two non-Mormon jurors were 1) 
biased, as were the six Mormons, or were 2) 
fa i r , upright, honest and dandy, so that the 
six Mormons likewise must have been fa i r , 
upright, honest and dandy, or that 3) the s ix 
Mormons converted the two non-Mormons to 
Mormonism while they were in the jury room, 
thus infecting them with the same presumed 
cholera of bias and prejudice with i t s 
malodorous atmosphere of incredulity. 
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Id. at 542. As in Barrow, the verdict in this case was 
unanimous, and the evidence against the Defendant was 
substantial. This Court should once again reject "the objection 
to the jury . . . a tenuous point born of futility in finding a 
more substantial point, — or technicality, if you please, to 
justify an appeal.* Parrow at 542. 
3. "Improper Considerations During 
Deliberations" 
Defendant argues that the Garner affidavit should be 
allowed to show that the jurors hypothesized facts not in 
evidence (that Ronnie was autistic). Several cases discussed 
supra demonstrate that this is incompetent evidence. £ee State 
v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662 (Utah 1972) (juror speculation of 
defendant's failure to take the stand was not admitted); groen v. 
Tri-Q-Inc, , 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983) (juror speculation that 
insurance would compensate the plaintiff was not admitted); gmith 
y. Barnettt 408 P.2d 709 (Utah 1965) (Juror consideration of 
unauthorized test not admitted)• Even if this were competent 
evidence, it does not meet the criteria necessary for overturning 
the verdict: 
(1) evidence from the jurors must 
consist only of objective facts as to what 
actually occurred in or out of the jury room 
bearing on the misconduct; (2) the acts or 
statements complained of must exceed 
tolerable bounds of jury deliberation; and 
(3) it must appear the misconduct was 
calculated to, and with reasonable 
probability did, influence, the verdict. 
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State vt Cullen, 357 N.W. 2d 24 (Iowa 1984). 
The Defendant relied on the Garner affidavit for proof 
of objectively noticeable prejudice during the jury 
deliberations. There would be no need for Defendant to imply 
that the jurors1 discussion on autism demonstrates that the 
jurors were manufacturing evidence with which to convict 
defendant. As is demonstrated by cases discussed supra, in which 
juror affidavits were not admissible to constrain deliberations 
through impeachment of verdicts, juries are given wide discretion 
in their deliberations. See gtate v. Geef 498 P.2d 662 (Utah 
1972); Groen v.Tri-Q~lQCr, 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983); Smith v. 
Barnett, 408 P.2d 709 (Utah 1965). As to whether or not the 
autism discussion was calculated to and probably did influence 
the verdict, because mental processes of the actual jurors are 
not subject to proof, URE 606(b), standards of reason must 
substitute for records of the deliberations. No reasonable 
person would be more likely to convict a defendant of second 
degree murder because the defendant's victim was autistic. 
Defendant's affiant contends that she and other jurors 
were compelled to agree to the verdict because of their concern 
for the age and apparent fatigue of two jurors. During jury 
selection, Judge Burns inquired if he jurors had any physical 
ailments or conditions that would make sitting through the trial 
difficult, and got no positive indications of such conditions. 
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(Tr. 75) Before the jury deliberations began, Judge Burns asked 
the jurors if they were free from fatigue and otherwise 
physically able to commence deliberations, and the jurors all 
agreed to begin deliberations. (Tr. 842) During the 
deliberations, the jurors were interrupted and given the option 
to recess for the evening, but they chose to eat their evening 
meal and continue (Tr. 846). After the meal, when Judge Burns 
asked the jurors if they wished to continue with their 
deliberations, they "vigorously and affirmatively raised their 
hands" in assent. (Tr. 849) 
In People v., Black, 725 P.2d 8 (Colo. Appl. 1986), 
defendant challenged a verdict by offering the testimony of two 
jurors who claimed that they were "mentally exhausted" and 
"unable to argue" with the majority of the jurors, and thus 
agreed to he unanimous verdict of guilty. The appellate court 
upheld the lower court1s refusal of a new trial, pointing out 
that the statutory codification of the common law barred the 
"inquiry into the mental processes of jurors in arriving at a 
verdict or into any matter or statement occurring during the 
jury's deliberations . . . except under narrowly circumscribed 
circumstances." Id. at 9 (citations omitted), gee also People 
v. Collins, 730 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1986) (allegations of juror 
failure to follow jury instructions and mental coercion of jurors 
were not allowed to be shown through the submission of juror 
affidavits). 
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One of the cases cited by the Black court to justify an 
exception to the general rule against invading the deliberations 
of the jury is Wharton v. People, 90 P.2d 615 (Colo* 1939), in 
which a juror reported that during the deliberations, the other 
jurors repeatedly swore at the juror, accused him of lying on 
voir dire when he disclaimed prejudice against the imposition of 
the death penalty in appropriate cases, threatened him 
physically, and followed him around the jury room, hounding him 
without reprieve. Although the juror reportedly broke down 
physically and cried, the jurors continued to brow beat him until 
he agreed to assent to the verdict. Even if the proffered facts 
of jury deliberations in the present case could be proved through 
competent evidence, like those in Slack, they do not justify 
abandoning the general proscription against the invading jury 
deliberations. 
Instruction No. 3 (R. 144) reads: 
The State of Utah and the defendant both 
are entitled to the individual opinion of 
each juror. It is the duty of each of you, 
after considering all he evidence in he case, 
to determine, if possible, the question of 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
When you have reached a conclusion in that 
respect, you should not change it merely 
because one or more or all of your fellow 
jurors may have come to a different 
conclusion. However, each juror should 
freely and fairly discuss with his fellow 
jurors the evidence and the deductions to be 
drawn therefrom. If, after doing so, any 
juror should be satisfied that a conclusion 
first reached by him was wrong, he 
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unhesitantingly should abandon that original 
opinion and render his verdict according to 
his final decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant did not submit questions during voir dire, 
and waived his opportunity to object to the inadequacy of the 
voir dire when he passed the jurors for cause. 
The Garner affidavit discusses the deliberations of the 
jury and the mental processes of individual jurors. It does not 
fall under any exception (briberyr chance, extraneous prejudicial 
information outside influence) to rules proscribing the 
admission of juror affidavits for impeachment of verdicts. 
Even if the affidavit were admissible evidence, the 
charges of bias, improprietyr and improper considerations do not 
describe circumstances that would have mandated disqualifying the 
jurors on a challenge for cause, had the information in the 
affidavit come out in voir dire. 
The jurors took an oath to and were repeatedly 
admonished to deliver a verdict based not on personal prejudices, 
but on the evidence presented to them during the trial. 
Defendant has not shown, and is barred by the rules of evidence 
from attempting to show, that the jurors convicted him in 
contravention of their oath and the court's admonitions. As was 
explained in Point I of this brief, the State provided ample 
evidence of Defendant's guilt. The jury's unanimous verdict 
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convicting Defendant of second degree murder should not be 
disturbed. 
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